Consumers in 2026 are spending almost 30 percent more for their groceries than they did in 2020, while last year alone the grocery oligarchs raked in over $6 billion in profits, an astounding 200 percent increase over their average net profit of $2 billion/year between 2015-2019.
This report identifies the causes of food price inflation by examining the farmers’ share of retail food prices in relation to consumer inflation. The evidence reveals that farmers have experienced stagnating prices for their products while consumer prices have increased. Ultimately, corporate profiteering is the primary reason for the widening gap between the farmers’ share and the grocery sticker price.
In Section 1 we caution that farmers’ declining share of food prices is contributing to a farm succession and ownership crisis that is jeopardizing the nation’s food security. We also provide a literature review of studies that have quantified and contextualized the farmers’ declining share of grocery prices in Canada. These studies have, to varying degrees, compared the “farmgate price”—the price farmers receive for their agricultural products from individual and corporate buyers and markets—and the price consumers see when they buy their food products at commercial outlets. The comparison of these two prices leads us to the “farmers’ share” of retail food prices.
Section 2 presents price data for 14 farmgate products and their retail equivalents for the last twenty to fifty years. The data demonstrates that the farmers’ share of food prices has generally declined. Retail prices for consumers have increased while the prices farmers have received for their products have seen little increase over the same time period. This data confirms our previous suspicion: corporate concentration in the Canadian food system is creating worse outcomes for both farmers and consumers.
The notable exception is where supply management policies exist to guarantee cost-of-production pricing for products such as milk, chicken, turkey, and eggs. Supply management has provided a higher farmers’ share of retail grocery prices than non-supply managed products since 2008. Supply managed products have produced an average return of 38% for farmers since 2008, while non-supply managed products have produced an average return of only 14%.
We conclude by reiterating that corporate power in the Canadian food system is the common enemy of farmers and consumers. We argue that strong structural policies and institutions, such as supply management and collective marketing institutions, have been effective in combatting corporate power and providing benefits to farmers and consumers. Canadian farmers and consumers, then, should organize around structural policy changes that create a sustainable food system for Canadians. Finally, we offer a number of policy solutions, including a guaranteed annual income for farmers and a public grocery store option, which provide exciting organizing opportunities for farmers and consumers.
