in union is strength

Index:

• Introduction
• Nature of the International Grain Market
• The Canadian Wheat Board
• Price Pooling
• Price pooled throughout the year
• CWB is a risk management tool for producers
• Financial management tool
• Equal delivery opportunity
• All profits are returned to producers
• The CWB markets quality
• The CWB helps value - added industries
• The CWB makes the most of a constrained transportation system
• The Canadian Wheat Board gives producers a sophisticated marketing tool
• Farmers are already working more than forty - hour weeks
• There are many problems with exporting
• Implications of marketing alternatives
• Dual marketing
• Continental barley market: an example of "Dual Marketing"
• Conclusion
• Footnotes

Introduction

We would like to thank you for this opportunity to present our views on western grain marketing. The National Farmers Union represents producers from across the country, the majority of whom are grain and oilseeds producers. We represent the concerns of family farmers, who are concerned about their livelihood, as well as that of their neighbours.

Western grain farmers have become very efficient in producing grain. But our livelihoods depend as much on the marketing of our product as on our ability to produce.

Currently western grains and oilseeds are marketed two different ways. There is the orderly marketing by the Canadian Wheat Board, which is defined by single-desk selling and price pooling, of western wheat and barley for export and domestic human consumption. The other marketing option is the open market, some crops being listed on the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, others not.

The Canadian Wheat Board is a single-desk marketing agent for western Canadian wheat and barley producers. Single-desk seller is defined as all producers marketing through the Wheat Board, that is all sales go through a 'single desk'. It pools the price it gets from all of its grain sales, and distributes that price equally, varying only with volume and quality. Thus the CWB is a good risk management tool for producers.

When a farmer sells through the Canadian Wheat Board, s/he delivers their grain to the local elevator and receives a set initial payment. The initial price is set and guaranteed usually at about 65 - 75 % of the annual average expected price. If the CWB sells all the grain at an average higher than the initial price, that added revenue is divided among all the producers selling through the Board. Thus the dollars earned from the sale of western wheat and barley go to farmers, not to shareholders or private traders.

Because all wheat and barley for export or human consumption goes through the CWB, it can assure its customers of certain volumes, getting a premium price. As well, single-desk selling allows the CWB to ensure consistent quality. This means that Canadian producers receive a premium price on the world market. The Wheat Board has world class stature as a first-class trading organization.

The Canadian Wheat Board is a conscious attempt to mitigate the continental forces of geography and economics. The Wheat Board sells only about 4 to 6 percent of Canadian wheat (1) to the United States market. That means the vast majority is sold off-shore. This acts to counteract the economic pressures forced upon Canada by the Canada-U.S. and NAFTA trade deals, which encourage North-South marketing.

The Canadian Wheat Board has control of a $4.5 to $7 billion industry. At present, this industry is now controlled by a strategic alliance between western Canadian grain farmers and the Canadian government. The CWB is responsible to the federal government through the Canadian Wheat Board Act, and the federal appointment of the Wheat Board Commissioners. This allows the government to guarantee the Board's initial prices, borrowing and credit sales. The government guarantee of borrowing alone saves farmers $40 million per year in interest charges. To put this in context, the CWB's operating costs were $44 million in 1994-95 (2).

If the CWB monopoly is destroyed, the Canadian market would be absorbed by the international grain companies. There would be no room for individual traders once Cargill, Continental Grain and ADM have the right to ship legally into the United States without restrictions. Control of this multi-billion dollar industry would be handed over to large transnational corporations.

This would lead to a marketing strategy shaped by transnational grain companies. The U.S. would pick up more of the international markets that were once Canadian, helped by the Export Enhancement Program.

The U.S. domestic market is relatively high in price (for Canadian farmers with Canadian dollars). The irony is that while some independent traders are lobbying for an open market, the cream in the U.S. market might go to a few individual Canadian farmers in the short-term, quickly it would go to the transnational traders, and never to Canadian farmers in general.

There is no question that the U.S. market is at present a premium market for a small portion of Canada's grain exports. Without the CWB, that market will see more Canadian grain competing to get the market, and thus a drop in prices for all concerned, including U.S. farmers.

There are 125,000 western Canadian farmers growing nearly 36 million tonnes of wheat and barley. Through the pooling system, the CWB sells the majority of this grain to more than 70 different markets and divides the proceeds among farmers in an equitable way.

Even in an unusual year like 1993-94, the U.S. market only accounts for about 13 per cent of the wheat, 48 per cent of the barley and 16 per cent of the durum Canadian exports. The rest of the grain is sold into other markets where customers often have access to subsidized product.

Nature of the International Grain Market

The Canadian Wheat Board is a conscious alternative to the international grain trading system. The International grain trading system is dominated by a few large grain trading companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Continental Grain, and others. While doing research on corporate concentration in agribusiness, Al Krebs noted "by the end of the 1970's, just six companies ... exported 96 percent of all U.S. wheat, 95 percent of its corn, 90 per cent of its oats and 80 per cent of the nation's sorghum." The same six control over 60 per cent of the world's grain traffic. (3)

These large companies are making significant profits from this trade. The U.S. Grain Trade, over years of 1991, 1992, 1993 have returned five-year return to equity of 18.36%, six percentage points higher than the total industry average. (4)

Canada only produces 5% of the world's wheat and 7% of the world's barley, yet we have over one fifth of the world's market in both these crops (5). Our closest competitors are the United States and the European Union, holding 36.1% and 17.3% of the world wheat market respectively (6).

Both the U.S. and E.U. compete primarily on price, often highly subsidizing their product in order to undercut competitors. The Canadian Wheat Board, through its ability to ensure quality backed with customer service, has become a very successful global competitor.

The Canadian Wheat Board

Single-Desk Selling

Because all sales go through a 'single-desk', the Canadian Wheat Board can offer customers consistent quality and a predictable supply. This has led the CWB to have a world-class reputation and means a premium price for Canadian producers.

The assured supply also allows the CWB to price differentiate. In many markets Canadian grain has to compete against subsidized grain from the E.U. and/or the U.S.. The CWB can sell into the non-subsidized markets for a high price, and still gain enough market share in the subsidized regions to market all of western Canada's production.

In a recent paper evaluating the Canadian Wheat Board's performance, Drs. Hartley Furtan, Daryl Kraft and Ed Tyrchniewicz calculated that the Canadian Wheat Board had earned producers an extra $264 million per year through its sales of red spring wheat. That number rises when one looks at the period since the U.S. introduced the Export Enhancement Program. "When we looked at No's 1,2 and 3 CWRS combined during the subsidy period, the CWB earned an average premium of at least $28.00 per tonne premium for farmers on exports," said Dr. Furtan (7). That translates into a premium of between $557 million to $690 million going to Canadian producers due to the ability of the Canadian Wheat Board to price differentiate.

The Kraft, Furtan and Tyrchniewicz paper notes that "Multiple sellers are unable to differentiate between commercial and subsidized buyers." (8) Therefore the Canadian Wheat Board would not have been able to realize these premiums if it was not a single-desk seller. Further implications of ending the Canadian Wheat Board's monopoly are discussed later in the paper.

The International Joint Commission on Grains suggests options such as public offer pricing for the Canadian Wheat Board, or audits of CWB sales. The National Farmers Union notes that both of these two suggestions would disadvantage the Canadian Wheat Board and therefore western wheat and barley producers.

While the Joint Commission's report in unclear on how public offer pricing would work, it might act as a fixed price meaning that the CWB could no longer price to market. It could imply a price floor, to which the Canadian Wheat Board alone would be subject. A competitor would only have to offer grain at a small amount below that price floor to access traditional Canadian markets. In either case, the public offer price would apply only to the CWB, putting it at a trade disadvantage.

A mandatory audit would place the Canadian Wheat Board at the mercy of an international group who could scrutinize their sales. There is no assurance that the auditing information would not go to Canada's grain competitors. Again, this procedure would only apply to the CWB and not to other international grain traders.

The National Farmers Union recommends that the federal government reject suggestions such as voluntary pooling, public offer pricing or mandatory auditing that would put the Canadian Wheat Board at a trade disadvantage.

Price Pooling

All producers will, at any time during the crop year, receive the same initial payment for the same grade of grain delivered to Thunder Bay or Vancouver. The total payment for the crop year will result in price spreads between grades that reflect the relative value that the market has placed on the grade over the crop year. The Wheat Board pools the timing of sales throughout the year, sales opportunities that exist for various grades, the direction of sales to either east or west coast ports, and the marketing costs associated with selling a particular grade.

Price pooled throughout the year

From a producer perspective, the pooling of time of sales is of key importance. Because commodity prices can fluctuate dramatically throughout the year, the 'highs' rarely coinciding with one's need for cash-flow, the CWB allows all producers to benefit equally from the high prices, not just those with large enough financial reserves to be able to wait.

The price fluctuations in the open market can be illustrated with the case of the canola market. In 1991-92, the spread between highest and lowest average price was $47/tonne. In 1992-93, that spread rose to $80/tonne, and in 1993-94, it jumped to nearly $160/tonne. In 1993-94, Canola reached a high of $402.97 in June '94, having hit a low of $262.65 in late 1993 (9). That means $332.81 was the mid point price. Over half of the canola sold at under $300 per tonne, and only one third of the canola was sold at the higher half of the price range.

The majority of producers were forced to take prices at the lower end of the spectrum, and only a very few were able to benefit from the high prices.

The National Farmers Union recommends that prices continue to be pooled throughout the year.

CWB is a risk management tool for producers

Because agricultural production is notoriously susceptible to price fluctuations, producers see the benefits of the CWB's price pooling. Due to price pooling, farmers see the averaged price, as opposed to being left to the whims of the market. This is particularly important as it is only a few producers who can ever take advantage of extraordinarily high prices in an open market.

Financial management tool

The interest-free cash advance is very useful on the farm. It allows for payment of bills in the fall after the crop is harvested without pressuring farmers to sell and haul grain at a time when prices are not optimum or when the elevator is full. The Canadian Wheat Board in combination with the interest-free cash advance program is a good financial management tool.

The Wheat Board also gives producers a guaranteed initial price. This price sets the base price which is reliable for financial planning, knowing that the only possible movement is up. The regular publication of the Pool Return Outlooks keep producers updated in what they will likely receive at the end of the year.

The initial payment guarantee acts like an insurance program for producers, guarding against a dramatic drop in price. Although, one does not want to use this 'insurance', in 1990-91 world prices for wheat dropped substantially due to the increased use of subsidies by the U.S. and European Union. The Gulf War also meant a loss of some wheat sales to the Middle East. The pool account was left with a deficit of $744 million which was covered by the federal government. That translates into about $6,000 for every farmer who delivered to the Wheat Board that year (10).

This is an example of the value of the partnership with government. Only rarely has this been a financial cost to government, thus it does not contribute to deficit, but it is a great aid in stabilizing the financial picture for farmers.

As a producer, one can also rely on the Wheat Board to pay you for your crop. One never has to worry that you might not get paid, or that the cheque will bounce. Growing grain is already a gamble, marketing grain with the Canadian Wheat Board, is not.

The National Farmers Union recommends that the federal government continue to guarantee the CWB initial payment.

Equal delivery opportunity

Currently, due to the pooling process, the location of the farm does not give an individual farmer better access to deliver grain given the former quota and present contract system.

With the concentration of the grain transportation and elevation system, farmers are already becoming increasingly disadvantaged due to their location. Equity of delivery is key to giving farmers in some remote, but very productive areas the possibility of continuing to produce.

All profits are returned to producers

The great advantage of the Canadian Wheat Board is that all profits from the grain sales are returned (minus the small operation costs of 4.7 cents/bushel) to producers. The Canadian Wheat Board is not trying to reap a profit. With the often low and long term declining price of primary products, farmers cannot afford to have our narrow margins further eroded by profit-takers between ourselves and our customers.

As a comparison with the open market, a non-board crop like canola is illustrative of the extra funds going into grain company coffers as opposed to farmers' pockets.

Table 1 (11)

To calculate the money going to grain companies for transporting and marketing a crop, one has to consider the basis. The definition of a basis is the futures price less the street price, that is, it is the difference between the price of a crop at export position versus what is being paid for it in the elevator, with the transportation time-lag calculated in.

Noting the statistics for the 1994-'95 crop year in Table 1, total incremental costs in the canola basis (at Calgary) were calculated at $47.67/tonne, compared to $29.34/tonne for wheat. Producers could have had $17.22 per tonne, or 39 cents per bushel, less marketing costs, more in their pocket. Instead this profit was captured by the grain companies.

The argument made at the time was that there was a flood of canola which was difficult for the elevator system to move. The high basis was an attempt to discourage further canola delivery. What is worth noting is that this occurred in a year when the car allocation process favored salable, off-board crops like canola. There is no guarantee that the future car allocation process will work in this way (12).

Currently the grain companies are taking $20 per tonne 'opportunity basis' on canola just in case something goes wrong (13).

The ability of the CWB to minimize basis has been noted by others as well. After looking at flax and canola basis over the last 15 years, Furtan, Kraft and Tyrchniewicz state that the Canadian Wheat Board is saving producers a minimum of $5.53 per tonne due to its ability to minimize risk management costs (14).

With a CWB crop, farmers are assured that the basis is only the cost of getting the grain to the customer. The CWB is accountable and transparent, clearly listing its balance sheet, assuring farmers that they are receiving a fair return. There is no such transparency or assurance in an open market system.

For the open market to deliver a basis that is close to representing the actual costs of getting the grain to export position, one needs both a good degree of competition among grain companies and relatively unconstrained access to the transportation and handling system (15). Neither of these two factors are readily available in the Canadian grain marketing and transportation system.

The National Farmers Union recommends that the federal government expand the mandate of the Canadian Wheat Board to include the marketing of other grains and oilseeds.

The CWB markets quality

The CWB focuses on developing a quality product, differentiating this product in the eye of the customer and providing quality service. This approach, which is integral to the Canadian grain marketing system, requires considerable investment, discipline, innovation and commitment by industry players and government.

The Canadian Wheat Board along with the Canadian Grain Commission work to ensure consistent high quality grain. Measures like Kernel Visual Distiguishability (KVD) allow for the visual distinction of each type of wheat, each variety can be separate, which is important as each variety has different quality characteristics. During the loading of a vessel, the wheat is inspected on a continuous basis to ensure that each shipment meets or exceeds the export standards established for each grade of grain.

The use of End Use Certificates ensures that unregistered varieties do not get mixed in shipments, which would undermine Canada's reputation for guaranteed quality.

The National Farmers Union recommends that Canada continue its use of End Use Certificates.

The Canadian Wheat Board can blend wheat at the ports to ensure that one load of 1 CWRS has the same characteristics as another load. This would not be possible for smaller shippers, or for the Wheat Board without its monopoly, as one needs volume coming from a variety of regions in the production area to ensure a proper mix.

The CWB helps value - added industries

For value-added industries to be of benefit to farmers, they cannot rely on a supply of cheap raw product. Often the value of the raw product makes up only a small percentage of the final price, which implies that processors should be able to offer the producer a reasonable price for their crop without jeopardizing their balance sheet.

Domestic value added industries need a reliable supply of consistent quality product. The Canadian Wheat Board can provide this at a competitive price.

As well, value added industries need rural infrastructure, to facilitate transportation of goods. Many producers, especially those either starting or expanding a value-added business, require access to capital at reasonable rates. Another component for many of those starting out in the value-added industry is market access, perhaps in the form of a collective marketing structure.

The CWB makes the most of a constrained transportation system

Canada's grain producers are further away from tide-water than any of our global competitors. We exported a record 37 million tonnes of grain last year by rail. Those rail transportation costs are a large component of producers' costs. As an example, at $40 per tonne, rail freight rates will take about 20% of the producers' return on wheat. Therefore producers rely on transportation as much as they do on marketing.

Currently, the Canadian Wheat Board is active in train run programming. Rail cars loaded with CWB grains have a faster turn-around time than those with off-board grain.

Canada's transportation system suffers from capacity constraints in storage and hopper cars. The Canadian Wheat Board currently plays a significant role in the transportation system through train-run programming. The Board's role in the transportation system increases efficiencies to the whole system including producers.

Because of the nature of our system, these efficiencies are key. When the Agriculture Canada Grains and Oilseeds Regulatory Review of September 1992 in its section on grain car allocation notes, "The coordination of a transportation function appears useful in light of limited terminal space and changing customer requirements," it recognizes the benefits of a single-coordinating body such as the Canadian Wheat Board.

The National Farmers Union recommends that the Canadian Wheat Board continue to play an integral role in Canada's transportation system through train run programming.

The CWB's price pooling also has an impact on transportation efficiency. As an example, in an open market, 'spot prices' will cause a surge of grain movement. With the current capacity constraints, this can lead to the system getting plugged. Because of price-pooling, the Wheat Board can spread deliveries more evenly, taking capacity into account, making the most of our current transportation infrastructure (16).

The Canadian Wheat Board gives producers a sophisticated marketing tool

The excellence of the Canadian Wheat Board cannot be duplicated with personal computers or through brokers. What producers are doing when they use the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, or engage in contracting, is pricing, not marketing.

Marketing involves making contact with your customers and finding out what they want. Later it can often involve technical services.

There are many examples of the CWB market development. The marketing program is noted by Commissioner Richard Klassen in a speech to the Western Canadian Wheat Growers (17): "We conducted seminars and short courses on Canadian grains with end-users. We invited many customers to Canada to see our production and marketing system first hand. In fact, over 365 Latin Americans have participated in CIGI (Canadian International Grains Institute) courses over the last decade -- many of them Brazilians. All of this activity has complemented our sales efforts. Brazil, for example, is now one of Canada's top five wheat customers. ... Our efforts are not limited to Latin America. We hold seminars and feeding trials, symposiums and short courses, involving customers from Asia, the Middle East and Europe."

Marketing is not a matter of phoning around to see who will give you the best price. Such a limited pricing strategy is constantly open to collapse due to competitors with lower sales prices.

Farmers are already working more than forty - hour weeks

Most producers do not have the extra time to sit on the telephone or computer pricing their grain. Statistics Canada shows that classical farmers are working 59 hour weeks (18). On average, producers are getting two thirds of their income from off-farm sources. Farmers do not have the time to market their own grain, nor is it efficient for them to do so.

There are many problems with exporting

Exporting by individuals can be quite risky and there is no real protection. Perceived or real economic advantages over a period of time can be wiped out with one bad deal.

For those producers who see themselves as budding grain exporters, there are many hazards involved in marketing into an export market. As examples, Hart Haidn, from Fort St. John, B.C., a producer/exporter of fescue seed gave anecdotal evidence of exporting difficulties:

"We have been exporting Creeping Red Fescue for use in lawn seed blends to the U.S. since 1988. The seed is shipped in truckloads of 40,000lbs - 45,000lbs.

If it is determined that there are indeed problems, the seed has to be sold at a hefty discount or shipped back. In either case the losses can be significant."

Implications of marketing alternatives

Continental marketing

If the grain trade is authorized to purchase wheat and barley outside of CWB jurisdiction for export to the U.S., some complicated questions arise. Storage space would need to be designated for grain targeted for the U.S.. A separate price would need to be offered. Grain purchased for shipment to the U.S. that could not immediately be exported would overhang the market and congest limited elevator facilities. Pressure would immediately build to allow wheat and barley exports elsewhere in competition to the Board. A 'Continental Market' would rapidly lead to a 'Dual Market'.

It is quite apparent that open-market advocates want first and foremost to hijack as much of the premium U.S. wheat and barley market for themselves as possible to insulate themselves against sharing lower international prices. As some individuals claim priority for U.S. markets for themselves, they disadvantage all other permit book holders. As these few traders drive down the U.S. premium, all other producers in less-advantageous positions are forced to absorb the brunt of lower average world prices.

Canadian grain, hauled by truck and delivered to U.S. elevators creates congestion in their system and would increase pressure for the U.S. to cap the flow or close the border. The CWB sells to end-users and ships by laker or U.S. hopper cars. Increased sales to the U.S. by individuals will only exacerbate the already increasing tensions between Canadian and U.S. grain producers.

In fact, the USDA recently announced it was going to tighten up reporting requirements on imported Canadian wheat under the new End-Use Certificate program that started earlier this year. The USDA noted that "... consolidated Farm Service Agency proposes to amend the regulations ... to require importers and subsequent buyers to provide immediate notification to purchasers and grain handlers when wheat being sold is of Canadian origin." This comes from concern that Canadian wheat is being mixed with U.S. wheat for resale, possibly collecting U.S. EEP payments.

From the Great Falls Tribune (Montana), November 30, 1995, "A sharp rise in Canadian barley sales to the United States is stirring concern in Montanans who hope to bring the matter to the attention of U.S. trade officials. ... Despite record-high prices for barley, farmers are worried that Canadian barley will be sold to grain elevators in border states such as Montana and push down local prices. And if markets for feed barley already are filled with Canadian imports, there could be less demand for domestic barley."

Alan Bergman, President of the North Dakota Farmers' Union, specifically targets dual marketing as a concern of U.S. producers.

"The legalization of a dual marketing structure in Canada, with producers and grain handlers having open access to the U.S. market, would be of concern to the producers on this side of the border....

3) diminish the ability of the Canadian Wheat Board to command premiums utilizing a marketing strategy based on a marketing strategy requires discipline and management at the U.S. border, to assure the commitment of sale of Canadian wheat and barley." (19)

Dual marketing

The concept of legalizing exports outside of the Canadian Wheat Board cannot be restricted to a few hundred farmers. It will immediately enable the large grain-trading companies to sell into the U.S. and other markets, not only in competition to the Board, but in competition to the very individuals who are now clambering for special privilege.

Canadian wheat and barley producers would receive lower pooled price returns if export sales were permitted outside the Wheat Board. An open border with multiple sellers would lower Canadian producer export prices to those of the lowest priced market. It would pit Canadian farmers against each other in the fight for markets.

The Canadian Wheat Board was first established in 1935 under a 'dual' system. In the first year, grain prices fell below the initial price and the Board received the vast majority of the grain. This was almost completely reversed two years later when the world price was above the initial price. It was legislated that farmers could not sell to the Board if the prices were above a certain amount, and that they had to sell to the grain traders. Notably, the Board received hardly any grain that year. The Board only survived that next year because of a need to distribute seed to Saskatchewan, which had suffered a severe drought.

In hindsight, it is obvious that this 'dual' system was a boon to the traders, as they would get the grain when the price was rising over the crop year, and would not when prices were falling. Thus the grain trade was basically ensured a profit.

Farmers continued to push for a single-desk system. This, along with the problems the government had covering initial payments and keeping grain deals without a secure supply, led the government to give the CWB a monopoly in 1943.

Continental barley market: an example of "Dual Marketing"

To see the consequences of ending the Board's monopoly, one need look no further than the experiment in 'dual marketing' in 1993. In June of that year, the Minister of Agriculture created a "continental Barley Market" allowing sales of barley into the United States outside of the Wheat Board. Malting barley prices dropped by an average of $49/tonne during the brief time the continental barley market was in effect. The price for six row malting barley was $159 per tonne prior to the Continental Barley Market. It then dropped to about $107 to $115 per tonne (off-board bids using Instore Thunder Bay equivalent basis.) After the Continental Barley Market ended, it rose again to $160 per tonne (20). Farmers lost. The grain trade profited. Dual marketing failed.

The National Farmers Union recommends that the Canadian Wheat Board retain its monopoly over western wheat and barley sales for export or human consumption.

Conclusion

"There is not now, and never has been, a free market in wheat." (21) The international grain market is controlled by a small number of large grain trading companies. Orderly marketing is one way for many producers to be able to gain market power in a system dominated by a small number of large players.

Producers are well served by Canada's orderly marketing system. Agriculture is already a notoriously risky business; depending on uncontrollable factors such as weather. Producers should not be forced to risk their livelihoods marketing their product. We have an agency that collectively markets our wheat and barley efficiently and effectively, at low cost, and with high returns to us.

Looking at canola as an example of the open market system, we see that grain companies are keeping a sizable profit from our oilseed production. Producers are left to the whim of the marketplace and their creditors as to whether they can market the grain when the price is high or low.

Canadian farmers have lived through the so-called 'benefits of the open market'. During the continental barley market, producers saw the effects of 'dual marketing' which saw the drop of malting barley prices by $50 per tonne. Living with the commodity exchange spawned early farmers protests to create farmer-owned grain companies. The wheat board's organization followed and its monopoly powers were later granted precisely because dual marketing did not work.

The Canadian Wheat Board works well for Canadian farmers and Canadian grain customers. From a farmer's perspective, there are changes needed in the grain marketing system which consist of expanding the Canadian Wheat Board powers.

1. The U.S. accounted for 4.7% of Canada's wheat exports, including durum, from 1990 - 1993
   
   
2. Grain Matters, December 1995
   
   
3. A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers, Essential Books, Washington, D.C., 1992
   
   
4. Nebraska Farmers Union News Release
   
   
5. According to the Canadian Wheat Board figures, Canada has 20.7% of the world wheat market, and 25% of the world barley market
   
   
6. CWB Grain Matters, Jan-Feb. 1996
   
   
7. 1994 CWB figures
   
   
8. Kraft, Furtan and Tyrchniewicz, Performance Evaluation of the Canadian Wheat Board, January 1996
   
   
9. National Grains Bureau, 1994
   
   
10. CWB submission to the Western Grain Marketing Panel, October 20, 1995
    
    
11. CWB Submission to the Western Grain Marketing Panel, October 20, 1995
    
    
12. Canadian Wheat Board submission to the Western Grain Marketing Panel
    
    
13. Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Senior Market Analyst, Agriculture and Transportation Conference in Nipawin, Sk., December 12, 1995
    
    
14. Kraft, Furtan, Tyrchniewicz, Performance Evaluation of the Canadian Wheat Board, January 1996, p. ix
    
    
15. Canadian Wheat Board submission to the Western Grain Marketing Panel, October 20, 1995
    
    
16. Elliot, Andrew and R.L. Banks & Associates, Modernizing the Grain Car Allocation System in Canada, prepared for the Saskatchewan Grain Car Corporation, November 20, 1995
    
    
17. January, 1995, WCWGA Convention, Lake Louise, Alta.
    
    
18. Statistics Canada defines a classical farmer as a person who has farm income and a farm-related occupation, from People in Canadian Agriculture, Statistics Canada, May 1995.
    
    
19. From the North Dakota Farmers Union brief to the Western Grain Marketing Panel
    
    
20. Ward Weisensel, CWB, "Questions and answers on the continental barley market" as reprinted in the Union Farmer, March 1994
    
    
21. Toronto Sun, Aug. 15, 1994